OpenSSH (Alpine) · CVE-2026-123158
SSHole
Patch nowExploited, in CISA KEV. Alpine-style sshd only.
On Linux systems that use musl libc and run sshd without PAM, mainly Alpine, an attacker can log in to password-less accounts (key-only users, Alpine's cloud alpine user) just by sending a very long password. Attacks started within hours of disclosure on 5 Nov 2026. Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora and other glibc systems aren't affected.
How scary is it?
Are you affected? only if all are true
1sshd uses musl libccommand
Alpine and other musl-based systems, including Alpine containers that run sshd. glibc systems (Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, RHEL) and Dropbear are not affected. A line with ld-musl means musl.2,5,7
ldd "$(command -v sshd)" | grep -i musl2PAM off, password login oncommand
Alpine's openssh-server is built without PAM, so sshd -T prints no usepam line. openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes is safe. passwordauthentication yes is the default. Run as root.1,2,8
sshd -T | grep -Ei '^(passwordauthentication|usepam|permitrootlogin) '3A * account plus a real hashcommand
Some account has * as its password (key-only users, root since about Alpine 3.16 if PermitRootLogin yes, the alpine user in cloud images 3.18.11–3.24.3) and at least one account has a $5$ or $6$ hash. Directory-service users (nslcd, winbind, sssd) with no shadow entry also count, and the commands below miss them. Locked ! accounts are safe. Run as root; the second command counts real hashes.2
awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow; grep -cE '^[^:]*:\$[56]\$' /etc/shadow4openssh below the fixed packagecommand
Upstream: OpenSSH before 10.6p2. Alpine's fixed packages are listed under Upgrade.9,2
apk info -v | grep '^openssh'What to do
1Upgrade openssh, then restart
Install the fixed package for your Alpine branch (listed below; fixes go back to 3.16). Run apk upgrade -U -a, then rc-service sshd restart: upgrading alone leaves the old sshd running. Other musl builds: OpenSSH 10.6p2.1,2,3
Latest safe versions checked 20 Nov
2Can't upgrade? Turn off passwordscommand
In sshd_config (or a drop-in in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ on Alpine 3.19+). Also set any PasswordAuthentication yes inside Match blocks to no; a drop-in doesn't override those. Check key login works, validate with sshd -t, then restart sshd and confirm sshd -T shows passwordauthentication no.2
PasswordAuthentication no3Look for break-inscommand
A password login for root, alpine or any key-only user is a red flag. Also review doas use, new users, new authorized_keys entries and changed files. If you can't rule out a login, treat the host as compromised. US federal agencies must also do forensic triage under the KEV listing.2,4
grep 'Accepted password for' /var/log/messagesThis page shows you how to check. It can't tell you you're safe.
Sources (10) and changelog
- OpenSSH: 10.6p2 release notes 5 Nov
- Alpine: advisory, conditions, fixed packages 5 Nov
- Alpine security tracker: fixed versions
- CISA KEV: added 9 Nov, due 12 Nov 9 Nov
- CSO Online: how it works, who's affected 5 Nov
- Help Net Security: exploited within hours 6 Nov
- Researcher: checker script and PoC
- openssh-portable: sshd -T shows usepam only with PAM
- CVE record: OpenSSH before 10.6p2, 256–1024 chars
- Alpine packages: current openssh per branch
- Dropped a conflicting Alpine 3.19 tracker version (the package index matches the advisory). Safe versions added.
- Review: directory-service accounts, Match blocks, and the CVE record's version and length range added.
- Added to CISA KEV, due 12 Nov.
- Attacks seen within hours of the fix.
- Published.